Revised 11/10/97

BURGLARY IN THE SECOND DEGREE
(N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2b)

(Read Indictment)

(WHERE APPLICABLE CHARGE PERTINENT PART OF N.J.S.A. 2C:1-14p):

(Charge when appropriate.)

(Charge when appropriate.)

(Charge when appropriate.)

the actor's situation. "Recklessness," "with recklessness" or equivalent terms have the same meaning.8

(Charge if applicable.)

(Charge when appropriate.)

OR

[was armed with or displayed what appeared to be (explosives) (a deadly weapon)], then you must find the defendant guilty of burglary in the second degree.

1 If "surreptitiously remaining" is in your case, charge as follows: that the defendant surreptitiously remained for some duration in the (research facility) (structure), or a separately secured or occupied portion thereof knowing that (he/she) was not licensed or privileged to do so. [See N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2a(2) and Cannel, Criminal Code Annotated, Comment 4, N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2 (requirement that this offense "requires a stay of some
duration")]. "Surreptitiously" means secretly, stealthily, or fraudulently. [Black's Law Dictionaryat p. 1445 (6th ed. 1990).

2 N.J.S.A. 2C:18-1.

3 State v. Robinson, 289 N.J. Super. 447, 455 (App. Div. 1996); N.J.S.A. 2C:1-14k.

4 "[W]here the circumstances surrounding the unlawful entry do not give rise to any ambiguity or uncertainty as to a defendant's purpose in entering a structure without privilege to do so [and] led inevitably and reasonably to the conclusion that some unlawful act is intended to be committed inside the structure, then specific instructions delineating the precise unlawful acts intended are unnecessary." Robinson, 289 N.J. Super. at 458 (emphasis in original). However, where the circumstances surrounding
defendant's purpose in entering or surreptitiously remaining in the structure or research facility are ambiguous, i.e., the evidence suggests both criminal and non-criminal purposes for the entry, then it might be necessary to direct the jury's consideration to the specific criminal acts alleged in the indictment, if there are any. See, for instance, State v. Marquez, 277 N.J. Super. 162, 168-169 (App. Div. 1994).

5 N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2b(1).

6 If the jury may find from the facts that although defendant entered the premises without permission, he did not do so with the purpose to commit an offense therein, then the unauthorized entry may constitute a criminal trespass. In that case, the jury should be charged on the appropriate lesser included offense of criminal trespass. See N.J.S.A. 2C:18-3.

7 N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2b(2).

8 N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2b(3).

9 For alternative definitions of attempt, see N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1.

10 See definition in N.J.S.A. 2C:11-1a.

11 If applicable, use the following definition from N.J.S.A. 2C:39-1(e): "Explosive" means any chemical compound or mixture that is commonly used or is possessed for the purpose of producing an explosion and which contains any oxidizing and combustible materials or other ingredients in such proportions, quantities or packing that an ignition by fire, by friction, by concussion or by detonation of any part of the compound or mixture may cause such a sudden generation of highly heated gases that the resultant gaseous pressures are capable of producing destructive effects on continuous objects.

12 Where applicable, use the following definitions of "deadly weapon" [N.J.S.A. 2C:11-1(c)] and serious bodily injury [N.J.S.A. 2C:11-1(b)]: "Deadly weapon" means any firearm or other weapon, device, instrument, material or substance, whether animate or inanimate, which in the manner it is used or is intended to be used, is known to be capable of producing death or serious bodily injury or which in the manner it is fashioned would lead the victim reasonably to believe it to be capable of producing death or serious bodily injury. "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.

13 State v. Merritt, 247 N.J. Super. 425, 430-431 (App. Div. 1991) ("[T]he term `armed' is not synonymous with the term `in possession of a weapon'...," which is the standard for mandatory sentencing under the Graves Act [N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6c]). "The term `armed' connotes not only possession but also immediate access to a weapon." Id. at 430.

14 This sentence should be considered when it is alleged that the weapon with which defendant was "armed" was part of the proceeds of a theft committed during the burglary. Merritt, 247 N.J. Super. at 430.